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THE PARABLE OF THE NONPLANTING ENTITY AND THE APPLE
TREE: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE
OF NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES
By Mitch Kline
INTRODUCTION

Non-practicing entities ("NPEs"), pejoratively referred to as "patent trolls," are controversial. 1 A "patent troll" is commonly defined
as an entity that licenses and enforces patents, but does not produce
any goods. 2 Critics accuse these entities of filing frivolous suits for
infringement of weak patents, while contributing no social benefit
through innovation or commercialization of their technologies. 3

1

See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, PATENTLY-0 (Feb. 29, 2012, 10:39
PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/guest-post-patent-troll-myths.html
("Few players in the patent system (maybe none) are more hated than patent trolls.").
2
See Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and
the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1809, 1810 (2007) (Patent trolls are
"firms that use their patents to extract settlements rather than license or manufacture
technology"); see also Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical
Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 115 (2010) (''NPEs are
firms that rarely or never practice their patents, instead focusing on earning licensing
fees.").
3
See Patent Quality Improvement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. 52 (2003) (testimony of David M. Simon, Chief Patent Counsel oflntel Corporation) (noting that patent trolls purchase "improvidently granted patents from distressed companies for the sole purpose of suing legitimate businesses"); Shrestha,
supra note 2, at 119 ("One of the most prominent criticisms against NP Es is that they
acquire weak and obscure patents and use them to pursue 'baseless' litigation.").
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Members of the patent community argue that these entities are a drain
5
on innovation4 and encumber productive industries.
6
Some scholars, however, take an opposing position. Supporters
of patent trolls argue that NPEs have an important role to play because
they: (1) hold producing entities accountable for the technologies they
employ; 7 (2) increase the liquidity of patents by acting as marketmakers; 8 and (3) enhance efficiency by specializing in valuing, licensing, and enforcing patents. 9
The NPE debate has become more than an item of academic curiosity-it is receiving attention from the public, the legislature, and the
judiciary. 10 Important legislative and judicial decisions are being
made that will have lasting and potentially profound implications for
11
the integrity of the patent system and, incidentally, for the economy.
James McDonough quoted the following passage from the Economist
to demonstrate the economic moment of the patent system:
4
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See Miranda Jones, Comment, Permanent Injunction, A Remedy by Any
Other Name Is Patently Not the Same: How Ebay v. Mercexchange Affects the Patent
Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON L. Rev. 1035, 1042 (2007) (commenting that many see ''NPEs as both opportunistic and detrimental to the advancement of innovation").
5 See Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction? Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 8 (2006) (opening statement by Lamar Smith, Chairman of the Subcommittee)
("[C]ritics assert [patent] trolls force manufacturers to divert their resources from
productive endeavors to combat bogus infringement suits.").
6
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 4, at 1040 (''NPEs are not a scourge of the patent system requiring a judicial cure. Rather, NPEs engage in activities useful to the
patent system.").
7
See id at 1044-45 ("[E]nforcement of the patent right by NPEs increases
the cost of free-riding," and thus "force[s] a free-rider to internalize some of the costs
associated with copying.").
8 James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY
L.J. 189, 223 (2006) ("By acting as a market intermediary for patents, collecting
information regarding patents and their associated industries, and forming relationships with corporations, a patent dealer becomes a focal point for those who create
and seek technology.").
9 Cf ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 13 (1806). See also infra Part III.
10 See John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) ("Patent reform
has become, perhaps improbably, one of the most contentious issues facing Congress
and the courts over the past six years."); see also, id at 31 ("Patent reform debates
have, perhaps unfortunately, focused a great deal of attention on 'patent trolls.'").
11 The reader should be wary of any proposed solution to a perceived problem with the patent regime, "the foundation of the U.S. economy. Before radical
changes are enacted at any level, it is imperative to ensure there really is a problem to
fix." McDonough, supra note 8, at 197.
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In recent years intellectual property has received a lot more
attention because ideas and innovations have become the
most important resource, replacing land, energy and raw materials. As much as [7 5%] of the value of publicly traded
companies in America comes from intangible assets, up from
around 40% in the early 1980s. Alan Greenspan, former
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, recently proclaimed
that "[t]he economic product of the United States ... has become 'predominantly conceptual." Intellectual property has
become the new economic foundation of the United States. 12
Consequently, it is important to have a balanced understanding of
the arguments surrounding NPE behavior and to meaningfully participate in the ongoing and evolving debate.
It is concerning that the discussion of NPEs has been rather onesided. 13 Save for a small body of academic literature, 14 the majority of
material on the subject is starkly opposed to NPE behavior. 15 This is
due, in significant part, to the efforts of large technology companies, 16
whose interests do not necessarily align with those of small entities,
individuals, or society in general. 17 Lobbying groups-such as the
Coalition for Patent Fairness ("CPF") and the Business Software Alli-

12

Id. at 191-92 (quoting A Marketforldeas, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2005, at 3
(special insert)).
13
McDonough, supra note 8, at 193 ("The general attitudes toward trolls are
almost uniformly negative.").
14
Id. at 197 ("Although some commentators recognize the potential value of
trolls, their utility is mentioned merely in passing.").
15
See id. at 196 ("Most commentators appear to side with big corporations,
and are salivating at the chance to talk about the troll attack, portraying patent trolls as
parasites on successful businesses and comparing them to the mold that eventually
grows on rotten meat." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16
Id. at 191 ("[T]here has been a concerted effort by large corporations and
legislators, backed by the media, to put a stop to the practices of these entities pejoratively known as patent trolls.").
17
Spencer Hosie, Patent Trolls and the New Tort Reform: A Practitioner's
Perspective, 4 I/S: J.L. & PoL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'y 75, 87 (2008) ("[W]hat is good for
these large technology companies is, in this instance at least, not good for America.").
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18

ance-are well funded by large technology companies, and have
19
very clear agendas that include curbing the activity of NPEs.
It is instructive to address the question of why many large corporations are so vehemently opposed to NPEs, 20 particularly if one entertains the idea that NPEs play a useful role in society. 21 The answer
to this question begins with an analysis of how and why the interests
of large technology corporations differ from those of other participants in the economy. Large technology corporations use the patent
system differently than small entities. 22 As opposed to small entities
and startups, which obtain patents in order to deter competition and to
present a more attractive opportunity to investors, 23 large technology
corporations typically use patents defensively. No single company in
an industry can own all of the patents relating to the products or services of that industry. Competing companies build up their portfolios
to have bargaining chips for cross-licensing negotiations; they inevitably find themselves infringing (or planning to infringe) each other's

patents. 24 This "symmetry deters much patent litigation in the industries in which it operates." 25
NPEs, however, act to disturb this arrangement. Because they do
not produce or sell any products, NPEs are not vulnerable to infringement suits, nor are they interested in cross-licensing26 Thus, the
threat of mutually assured destruction that prevents litigation between
competitors does not deter NPEs from bringing infringement suits
against large corporations. 27 Additionally, NPEs prevent large corporations from infringing on the patents of an individual inventor or a
small entity-an area where corporations previously acted with impunity. 28 But, unlike individual inventors and small entities, NPEs typically have the resources to enforce patents against large corporations. 29 Thus, the corporate giants are no longer immune.
The concerted effort to abolish NPEs is, therefore, not surprising. 30 NPEs have added a potentially significant cost to doing business
for large corporations, 31 as corporations must now internalize the cost
24

18

The Coalition for Patent Fairness includes as members: Apple, Google,
Intel, Microsoft, Cisco, Dell, HP, Oracle, Symantec, and others. Cade Metz, Techies
Oppose US Patent Reform Bill, THE REGISTER (Oct. 25, 2007, 10:56 PM),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/25/techies_send_letter_to_senate_against_paten
t reform bill/.
19 An article by the CPF argues that patent reform legislation needs "[T]o
minimize the impact of non-practicing entities that slow innovation and economic
growth." HR. 1260, the Patent Reform Act: Creating Jobs and Reducing Unjustified
Lawsuits from Non-Practicing Entities, THE COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS,
http://www.patentfaimess.org/pdf/HR_ 1260.pdf.
20
See GREGORY D. LEIBOLD, A Brave New World: How the Recession and
Non-Practicing Entities Have Reshaped the Licensing Marketplace and AttomeyClient Relationships, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING STRATEGIES 130 (2011
ed.) ("Most big businesses see NPEs as unscrupulous parasites on the patent system.").
21
See, Jones, supra note 4, at 1040; McDonough, supra note 8, at 223.
22
Notably, patent strategies vary across industries as well. It is primarily
technology companies-in the software and semiconductor industries, for examplethat are the topic of this discussion. As explained below, companies in these industries use the patent system defensively, so that competitors do not restrain them from
producing goods. These companies stand to benefit from a weaker patent regime,
which would make them less vulnerable to suits from outsiders (such as NPEs). Contrarily, the pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on patent protection. Thus, their
interests with respect to the patent system align more closely with those of startups,
individual inventors, and small entities.
23
See Gary M. Lauder, Venture Capital - The Buck Stops Where?, 2 MED.
INNOVATION & Bus. J., 14, 15 (2010) ("In most high-dollar venture investments, patents are essential to the company's and VC's ability to ensure that success will not be
taken away by competitors who free ride on the original company's R&D.").
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Carl A. Kukkonen, III, The Need to Abolish Registration for Integrated
Circuit Topographies Under Trips, 38 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 105, 135 (1997) ("Corporations often acquire patents for defensive purposes as bargaining chips in crosslicensing negotiations."); Defensive Ammunition Against Infringement Suits, Russ
KRArnc,
http://www.krajec.com/blog/defensive-ammunition-against-infringementsuits (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) ("Many large companies, especially in technology
fields, use their patent portfolios in this [defensive] manner. In this strategy, a company may amass a quantity of patents that may be used in the event of being sued by a
competitor. In essence, the patents become bargaining chips that are played after a
competitor sues for infringement or anything else for that matter.").
25
Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls1, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 615 (2008); see also Krajec, supra note 24 ("The silent
but powerful threat of a countersuit may prevent many lawsuits from even coming to
fruition .... ").
26
See generally LEIBOLD, supra note 20.
27
See LEIBOLD, supra note 20, at 125 ("The prevalent theory was, of course,
that competitors would be hesitant to sue for patent infringement if they believed that
they would be countersued. Call it the mutual-assured-destruction theory. In recent
years, however, the biggest threat to practicing companies has come from NPEs,
which are not generally subject to being countersued for patent infringement.").
28
See infra note 41 .
29
See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 127 ("[T]he inventor is unlikely to have the
resources to mount a serious infringement lawsuit. An NPE, however, has the capital
and other resources to litigate .... ").
30
See Robin M. Davis, Note, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls:
Permanent Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent
Reform Act of 2005 and Ebay v. Mercexchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 431,
434 (2008) (commenting that "Congress has examined a variety of potential options
for reducing the negative influence of patent trolls in American industry").
31
James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social
Costs of Patent Trolls, Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 11-45,
November
9,
2011,
available
at
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of the technologies they draw upon. 32 It is frustration with this reality
that led to lobbying groups like the CPF. 33 One commentator suggested that a more appropriate name for these groups would be "the 'Coalition to Immunize Large Infringers from Pesky Patent Suits. "' 34
These lobbying groups have successfully influenced the perception of
NPEs among the public and decision makers. 35 Some commentators
now analogize NPEs to entities enforcing rights in real property in
order to elucidate the apparent inconsistency in denouncing one who
enforces intellectual property while being apathetic towards those who
enforce real property. 36
The remainder of this Comment will take the form of a parable.
The purpose of this format is to build upon the analogy to the physical
world in order to provide a more intuitive framework within which to
conceptualize the debate surrounding NPEs. It also presents the debate
in a form that is more accessible to those without a background in
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patent law. Through the story of a man who enforces property rights
in apple trees, the parable will address some of arguments pertaining
to NPEs.
Part I will demonstrate how NPEs create a market for, and increase the liquidity of, patents. Part II will justify the high rents that
NPEs can extract as compensation for undertaking the risk and expense of enforcing patents. Part III will argue that NPEs specialize in
enforcing and licensing patents, and in doing so liberate resources that
can be put to uses that are more productive. Part IV will address the
argument that NPEs bring frivolous lawsuits and enforce weak patents.
THE PARABLE OF THE NON-PLANTING ENTITY AND
THE APPLE TREE
A. Prelude

http://www. bu. edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/Bessen-F ordMeurer-no-11-45rev. pdf (finding that ''NPE lawsuits are associated with half a trillion
dollars oflost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010.").
32
David Goldman, Patent Trolls Cost Inventors Half a Trillion Dollars,
CNNMoNEY
(Mar.
1,
2012,
7:02
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/21/technology/patent_troll_cost/index.htm (stating a
Boston University study showed that patent trolls ''have cost innovators $500 billion
in lost wealth from 1990 through 2010 .... ").
33
Cf Gene Quinn, IPWATCHDOG, Why Patent Reform Didn't Happen in
2 008,
http ://www.ipwatchdog.com/2008/12/28/coalition-for-patentinfringement/id= 1l60/ (last visited March 21, 2012) (The members of the CPF have a
"single minded pursuit [that] is to weaken US patents and insulate themselves from
ongoing patent infringement.").
34
Hosie, supra note 17, at 77.
35
See Id. (noting that attacks of these groups "have already been successful
in a subtle, but important way: in shaping the way federal district court judges view
patent cases .... ").In 2011, Congress signed into law the America Invents Act-the
"most significant legislative event affecting patent law and practice in more than half
a century." Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward A System of Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 24 (2011 ). Section
299 of the Act states that "accused infringers may not be joined in one action as defendants . . . based solely on allegations that they each have infringed the patent or
patents in suit." 35 U.S.C. § 299 (b) (2011). This provision was meant to increase the
cost of litigation, particularly involving NPEs, as now a patent owner must file a
separate suit against each infringer. See Robert C. Van Arnam, The Joinder Provision
in the Patent Reform Act: Leveling the Playing Field Against Multi-Defendant NPE
Suits,
WILLIAMS
MULLEN
(Sep.
15,
2011),
http://www.williamsmullen.com/resources/detail.aspx?pub=764 ("The effect is significant in patent litigation against NPEs, as previously such plaintiffs have paid one
filing fee to sue dozens of defendants in the same suit in the same forum.").
36
See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 8, at 199-200 (describing the hypothetical situation in which a company purchases property from an owner who lacks the
means to enforce her rights).

A provident middle-aged man, in planning for his retirement, decided to plant an apple tree on his farm. The man, known by his
friends as Tim, was never able to afford a proper fence with which to
surround his property, but a sign on the western border of the property
declared that, "this land-parcel #1345 on the register-belongs to
Tim." Tim planted his apple tree in a field some distance from his
house, as there the soil conditions were best suited for apple trees. He
cared for his tree until it matured and bore the finest fruit.
One day, Tim, having been confined to a wheel chair, was making
his way from his house to the apple tree. When the tree came into
view, Tim saw a man who was filling a basket with apples from the
tree. By the time Tim approached the tree, however, the man had finished picking apples and ran away.
· The man stealing apples from Tim was Jim the Baker, who was
using the apples as an ingredient in his famous apple crumble cake.
Jim travels from the town ten miles north of Tim's farm, every week,
to pick the best apples for his cake. He then sells his cakes at the town
market.
Jim was unaware that he was in fact stealing the apples: he assumed the tree was on public land. Of course, Jim could have learned
whether the land belonged to someone. 37 But doing so would have

37

See Jones, supra note 4, at 1052 ("[O]ne of the most accessible strategies
to protect against infringing on a patent is a meticulous patent clearance. Similar to a
title clearance, a patent clearance involves a detailed search of existing claims to the
invention that the corporation seeks to use.").
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of the technologies they draw upon. 32 It is frustration with this reality
that led to lobbying groups like the CPF. 33 One commentator suggested that a more appropriate name for these groups would be "the 'Coalition to Immunize Large Infringers from Pesky Patent Suits. "' 34
These lobbying groups have successfully influenced the perception of
NPEs among the public and decision makers. 35 Some commentators
now analogize NPEs to entities enforcing rights in real property in
order to elucidate the apparent inconsistency in denouncing one who
enforces intellectual property while being apathetic towards those who
enforce real property. 36
The remainder of this Comment will take the form of a parable.
The purpose of this format is to build upon the analogy to the physical
world in order to provide a more intuitive framework within which to
conceptualize the debate surrounding NPEs. It also presents the debate
in a form that is more accessible to those without a background in
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patent law. Through the story of a man who enforces property rights
in apple trees, the parable will address some of arguments pertaining
to NPEs.
Part I will demonstrate how NPEs create a market for, and increase the liquidity of, patents. Part II will justify the high rents that
NPEs can extract as compensation for undertaking the risk and expense of enforcing patents. Part III will argue that NPEs specialize in
enforcing and licensing patents, and in doing so liberate resources that
can be put to uses that are more productive. Part IV will address the
argument that NPEs bring frivolous lawsuits and enforce weak patents.
THE PARABLE OF THE NON-PLANTING ENTITY AND
THE APPLE TREE
A. Prelude

http://www. bu. edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/Bessen-F ordMeurer-no- l 1-45rev.pdf (finding that ''NPE lawsuits are associated with half a trillion
dollars oflost wealth to defendants from 1990 through 2010.").
32
David Goldman, Patent Trolls Cost Inventors Half a Trillion Dollars,
CNNMONEY
(Mar.
1,
2012,
7:02
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/21/technology/patent_troll_cost/index.htm (stating a
Boston University study showed that patent trolls ''have cost innovators $500 billion
in lost wealth from 1990 through 2010 .... ").
33
Cf Gene Quinn, IPWATCHDOG, Why Patent Reform Didn't Happen in
2008,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2008/12/28/coalition-for-patentinfringement/id= l l 60/ (last visited March 21, 2012) (The members of the CPF have a
"single minded pursuit [that] is to weaken US patents and insulate themselves from
ongoing patent infringement.").
34
Hosie, supra note 17, at 77.
35
See Id. (noting that attacks of these groups "have already been successful
in a subtle, but important way: in shaping the way federal district court judges view
patent cases .... ").In 2011, Congress signed into law the America Invents Act-the
"most significant legislative event affecting patent law and practice in more than half
a century." Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward A System ofInvention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 24 (2011 ). Section
299 of the Act states that "accused infringers may not be joined in one action as defendants ... based solely on allegations that they each have infringed the patent or
patents in suit." 35 U.S.C. § 299 (b) (2011). This provision was meant to increase the
cost of litigation, particularly involving NPEs, as now a patent owner must file a
separate suit against each infringer. See Robert C. Van Arnam, The Joinder Provision
in the Patent Reform Act: Leveling the Playing Field Against Multi-Defendant NPE
WILLIAMS
MULLEN
(Sep.
15,
2011),
Suits,
http://www.williamsmullen.com/resources/detail.aspx?pub=764 ("The effect is significant in patent litigation against NPEs, as previously such plaintiffs have paid one
filing fee to sue dozens of defendants in the same suit in the same forum.").
36
See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 8, at 199-200 (describing the hypothetical situation in which a company purchases property from an owner who lacks the
means to enforce her rights).

A provident middle-aged man, in planning for his retirement, decided to plant an apple tree on his farm. The man, known by his
friends as Tim, was never able to afford a proper fence with which to
surround his property, but a sign on the western border of the property
declared that, "this land-parcel #1345 on the register-belongs to
Tim." Tim planted his apple tree in a field some distance from his
house, as there the soil conditions were best suited for apple trees. He
cared for his tree until it matured and bore the finest fruit.
One day, Tim, having been confined to a wheel chair, was making
his way from his house to the apple tree. When the tree came into
view, Tim saw a man who was filling a basket with apples from the
tree. By the time Tim approached the tree, however, the man had finished picking apples and ran away.
The man stealing apples from Tim was Jim the Baker, who was
using the apples as an ingredient in his famous apple crumble cake.
Jim travels from the town ten miles north of Tim's farm, every week,
to pick the best apples for his cake. He then sells his cakes at the town
market.
Jim was unaware that he was in fact stealing the apples: he assumed the tree was on public land. Of course, Jim could have learned
whether the land belonged to someone. 37 But doing so would have
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See Jones, supra note 4, at 1052 ("[O]ne of the most accessible strategies
to protect against infringing on a patent is a meticulous patent clearance. Similar to a
title clearance, a patent clearance involves a detailed search of existing claims to the
invention that the corporation seeks to use.").
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taken time, which Jim did not have. Maybe Jim was simply apathetic-after all, he had been harvesting the apples for some time now
with no consequences. Moreover, he was able to sell his cakes at a
low price on account of the main ingredient's free availability.
Jim first became aware that Tim claimed ownership of the apple
tree when, while he was picking apples, Tim approached in his wheelchair shouting at him, "That's my apple tree. Get off my property!"
Jim was certainly not about to allow this man, shouting at him, to
ruin the system he had established. "This is public land," declared
Jim, "You have no claim to this tree." He placed his basket on the
ground, pushed Tim a distance away39, and then brought his apples
back to town. He wasn't sure whether Tim really was the tree's rightful owner; he rationalized, however, that there were plenty of apples,
and that he only picked a basket-full each week. Even if it was Tim's
tree, there were more than enough apples for the both ofthem 40 •
Jim continued about his business as usual. Tim, though frustrated,
realized there was nothing he could do. So, Tim called the Sherriff:
who told him that he would have to perform a title search, present
proof of ownership of the property, and prove that Jim was getting his
apples from Tim's tree. The property registry was located many miles
away, in the city, and the Sherriff was in a nearby town. Tim had no
means of transportation, and no idea how to navigate the institutions
involved. So, Tim sat at home, wondering if another venture would
have been more worthwhile. He thought maybe he should have taken
up knitting.
38

Performing a patent clearance to ensure that a product will not infringe any
patents "can be tremendously costly and time consuming because products such as
microprocessors and cell phones can easily be covered by dozens or even hundreds of
different patents." Shrestha, supra note 2, at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39
Small entity or individual patent owners can be bullied into submission by
larger corporations, who can infringe with impunity because the patent owners lack
the financial means to enforce their patents, or will be crippled by the cost. See Jeff A.
Ronspies, Comment, Does David Need A New Sling? Small Entities Face A Costly
Barrier to Patent Protection, 4 J. MARSHALL REv. lNTELL. PROP. L. 184, 196 (2004)
(conveying the story of Robert Keams, who invented the intermittent windshield
wiper, and spent over $10 million to enforce his patent against Ford); Accord Patent
Trolls: Fact or Fiction? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Prop. of the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 52 (2006) (statement of Lamar Smith) (noting that there are "bad actors who deliberately infring[ e]
the legitimate patent rights of others.").
40
Patents are non-rival assets-multiple parties can use them simultaneously
without diminishing each other's enjoyment. Even so, a patent owner has the right to
exclude others from the patent's use. E.g., McDonough, supra note 8, at 197 ('~Limit
ing the patent holder's ability to stop the infringing activity will severely diminish the
value of patents because the only right inherent in a patent is the right to exclude·
others from its use.") (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000)).

B. The Non-Planting Entity

Robert, a businessman, frequented the town market and particularly enjoyed Jim's apple crumble cake. Being a businessman, Robert
thought the price of Jim's cake suspicious. He knew that most of the
cake's ingredients were available wholesale at the market, and their
prices rarely fluctuated. Robert had also overheard a conversation in
which Jim revealed that the apples were the secret to his delicious
cakes. Eventually, Robert's curiosity got the best of him, and he followed Jim on an apple-picking excursion. Attempting to remain discrete, Robert entered Tim's property from the west side and saw his
sign. He walked until he could see Jim harvesting from the tree, and
then retreated to the house that he had passed along the way.
When Robert knocked on the door, he was greeted by Tim. Tim
explained his predicament, which Robert pondered. It occurred to
Robert that he was capable of taking all the steps necessary to enforce
property rights in the tree. He had a car, and he had experience dealing with the Sherriff and the property registry. "You've put a lot of
resources into that tree," said Robert, "how about I buy it from you?
That way you can profit from your investment, and I will try to recoup
my investment by obtaining a fee from Jim."
The two negotiated a price for the tree that accounted for the risk
and cost associated with the enforcement efforts. Tim was pleased and
relieved that he had found a way to monetize his tree; he could now
retire in comfort. Robert invested a significant sum of money in the
apple tree and was confronted with the difficult task of extracting value from his investment.
PART I: THE PROPERTY REGISTRY ATTENDANT AND
THE MAKING OF A MARKET

Robert first traveled to the property registry to make a copy of
Tim's title. When he arrived, he encountered a woman at the front
desk and asked for her help. She directed him to the area containing
the records for which he was looking.
"But I'm curious," said the woman, "why do you need the records
for someone else's property?" Robert explained the details of his venture to the woman-she did not look impressed. "But you contribute
nothing to the market," 41 she said. "The tree has already been planted,
41
It is commonly asserted that NPEs contribute nothing to the patent regime's goal of fostering innovation, or indeed nothing to society. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Mcfeely, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse the
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with no consequences. Moreover, he was able to sell his cakes at a
low price on account of the main ingredient's free availability.
Jim first became aware that Tim claimed ownership of the apple
tree when, while he was picking apples, Tim approached in his wheelchair shouting at him, "That's my apple tree. Get off my property!"
Jim was certainly not about to allow this man, shouting at him, to
ruin the system he had established. "This is public land," declared
Jim, "You have no claim to this tree." He placed his basket on the
ground, pushed Tim a distance away39, and then brought his apples
back to town. He wasn't sure whether Tim really was the tree's rightful owner; he rationalized, however, that there were plenty of apples,
and that he only picked a basket-full each week. Even if it was Tim's
tree, there were more than enough apples for the both of them 40 •
Jim continued about his business as usual. Tim, though frustrated,
realized there was nothing he could do. So, Tim called the Sherriff,
who told him that he would have to perform a title search, present
proof of ownership of the property, and prove that Jim was getting his
apples from Tim's tree. The property registry was located many miles
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have been more worthwhile. He thought maybe he should have taken
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microprocessors and cell phones can easily be covered by dozens or even hundreds of
different patents." Shrestha, supra note 2, at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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larger corporations, who can infringe with impunity because the patent owners lack
the financial means to enforce their patents, or will be crippled by the cost. See Jeff A.
Ronspies, Comment, Does David Need A New Sling? Small Entities Face A Costly
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without diminishing each other's enjoyment. Even so, a patent owner has the right to
~xclude others from the patent's use. E.g., McDonough, supra note 8, at 197 ('~Limit
mg the patent holder's ability to stop the infringing activity will severely diminish the
value of patents because the only right inherent in a patent is the right to exclude·
others from its use.") (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000)).

B. The Non-Planting Entity

Robert, a businessman, frequented the town market and particularly enjoyed Jim's apple crumble cake. Being a businessman, Robert
thought the price of Jim's cake suspicious. He knew that most of the
cake's ingredients were available wholesale at the market, and their
prices rarely fluctuated. Robert had also overheard a conversation in
which Jim revealed that the apples were the secret to his delicious
cakes. Eventually, Robert's curiosity got the best of him, and he followed Jim on an apple-picking excursion. Attempting to remain discrete, Robert entered Tim's property from the west side and saw his
sign. He walked until he could see Jim harvesting from the tree, and
then retreated to the house that he had passed along the way.
When Robert knocked on the door, he was greeted by Tim. Tim
explained his predicament, which Robert pondered. It occurred to
Robert that he was capable of taking all the steps necessary to enforce
property rights in the tree. He had a car, and he had experience dealing with the Sherriff and the property registry. "You've put a lot of
resources into that tree," said Robert, "how about I buy it from you?
That way you can profit from your investment, and I will try to recoup
my investment by obtaining a fee from Jim."
The two negotiated a price for the tree that accounted for the risk
and cost associated with the enforcement efforts. Tim was pleased and
relieved that he had found a way to monetize his tree; he could now
retire in comfort. Robert invested a significant sum of money in the
apple tree and was confronted with the difficult task of extracting value from his investment.
PART I: THE PROPERTY REGISTRY ATTENDANT AND
THE MAKING OF A MARKET

Robert first traveled to the property registry to make a copy of
Tim's title. When he arrived, he encountered a woman at the front
desk and asked for her help. She directed him to the area containing
the records for which he was looking.
"But I'm curious," said the woman, "why do you need the records
for someone else's property?" Robert explained the details of his venture to the woman-she did not look impressed. "But you contribute
nothing to the market," 41 she said. "The tree has already been planted,
41 It is commonly asserted that NPEs contribute nothing to the patent regime's goal of fostering innovation, or indeed nothing to society. See, e.g., Daniel J.
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the baker has access to a source of apples, the customers are eating
t~eir cakes, and the man who planted the tree has enough apples for
h~self. : our activity will increase the cost of producing apple cakes,
which will be passed down to consumers, who will have to pay more
for cake" 42
Robert knew this would be the result, if he was successful but he
~id not think it unjust. "Consumers will have to pay more," he ~eplied,
However, the price of the cakes does not presently account for the
cost of planting and caring for the apple tree. Should the price of a
cake not reflect the cost of all the ingredients that went into it?"
"I suppose," conceded the woman, "but everything seems to be
working out. Why should the customers have to pay for the apples?"
"Things worked out on this particular occasion. However, the
would-b~ tree planters may decide that it is not worth planting an apple tree 1f they cannot enforce their property rights in the fruit- 43 or
they may instead decide to cultivate a plant indoors, where the ~ublic
has no access to it, but it is also much less productive. 44 In that sense,
U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARiz. ST. L.J. 289, 304
(~008) ("The patent troll is one example of a patent holder that enjoys the exclusive
ng~ts afford~d by patent protection, but that adds no value that benefits society.").
~ts contention, however, demonstrates a narrow view of the commercial world. As
~his Comment explains, an entity may contribute in valuable ways other than producmg goods or conducting research.
42
. . " Op~onents ofNPEs contend that the royalties they extract from producing
entiti~s constitute a 'tax' that ultimately leads to less product development and higher pnces for consumers." John Johnson et al., Don't Feed the Trolls?, 42 LES
NOUVELLES 487, 487 (2007).
43 A
2008 study found that early-stage technology companies "sought patents
to pre~ent technology copying (a core patent function to be sure), but also to secure
financmg, and to enhance their reputation." Robert P. Greenspoon & Catherine M.
Cottle, Don't Assume a Can Opener: Confronting Patent Economic Theories with
Licensing a~~ Enforcement Reality, 12 COLUM. Sc1. & TECH. L. REV. 194, 211 (June
2, 2011) (citmg Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1255, 129: (2009)) http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=l2&article=4. However,
these funct10ns can only be served if there exists a credible threat of litigation. See
McDonough supra note 8, at 206 ("At a minimum, there must be a credible threat of
litig~~on to incentivize potential infringers to license the patent."). NPEs possess the
reqms1te funds to enforc~ a pat.e~t, a~d so provide the credible threat that is necessary
for the patent system to mcentiVIZe mnovation among smaller entities;. See Shrestha,
supra note 2, at 129 ("[B]y rewarding inventors who otherwise would have failed to
realiz~ any gains from their patents, NPEs could encourage further invention by both
those mventors and other similarly-situated independent inventors which would lead
'
to an increase in social welfare.").
44
The alternative to pursuing patent protection is to protect an innovation as
a .trade secret. ~ot only ~oes trade secret protection deprive the public of a patent's
di~~losure ~ction. but 1t also makes the risks, difficulty, and transaction costs of
raismg capital very difficult since important information must be kept secret. See,
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the market would suffer from a diminished supply as a result of growers' attempts to protect themselves.
.
.
.
"I provided the tree-farmer with another opt10~ to monetize his
tree. I expect that my activity will incentivize potential tree-farmers to
. a mark et c.ior them" 45
invest in new trees now that they know there 1s
The woman was satisfied with this argument, and wished Robert
good luck. Robert breathed a sigh of relief, having determined ~hat the
property did in fact belong to Tim. He proceeded to the pohce department to engage the SheriffSheriff.
PART II: THE SHERIFF AND THE PRICE OF RISK

A. Compensation for a Risky Investment

Upon his arrival, Robert described the apple tree affair to the
Sheriff, and explained that he wanted to be compen~ated for the apples Jim had stolen in the past. The Sheriff thought this to be reasonable on the condition that Robert could prove Jim's cakes were made
us~g his apples. Additionally, the Sheriff assured Robert that Jim
would be imprisoned in the event that Jim stole any more appl~s-:--a
threat that would afford Robert significant leverage when negotiatmg
a price for the apples.
The Sheriff was concerned, however, that Robert may take advantage of his now superior bargaining position; the Sheri~f was also. a
patron of Jim's bakery. "How will you determine the pnce you will
demand from Jim?" asked the Sheriff.
"I expect that I will negotiate for the highest price I ca~ attain~"
Robert answered. "I have taken on significant risk in pursmt of this

e.g., Incase, Inc. v. Timex Corp., 488 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2007); Tax Track S~ste~s
Corp. v. New Investor World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2007): A func~iomng
patent system "negates the natural incentive to conceal profi~able mforma~ion by
creating an incentive to disclose through the grant. of the pate~t 1:-g?t ... [a~d] m~uce~
an inventor to incur the financial risks involved m commercrnltzmg [an] mvention.
Jones supra note 4, at 1044.
.
.
' 45 See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 129-30 ("It is important.to keep i~ mmd,
however, that by rewarding inventors who otherwise w?uld h~ve failed to realt~e any
gains from their patents, NPEs could encourage further mven:10n by both those mv~n
tors and other similarly-situated independent inventors, which would lead to ~n 1~
crease in social welfare. This latter effect could balance or surpass any reduct10n m
social welfare that results from enforcement of dormant patents."). Additionally: a
well-functioning market for patents is essential for early-stage technology com~am~s
to raise capital. See Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 43, at 215 ("By enhancmg ltquidity in technology markets, NPEs create the very conditions that enable venture
capital to support start-up companies.").
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which will be passed down to consumers, who will have to pay more
for cake" 42
Robert knew this would be the result, if he was successful, but he
did not think it unjust. "Consumers will have to pay more," he replied
"However, the price of the cakes does not presently account for th~
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"I suppose," conceded the woman, "but everything seems to be
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the market would suffer from a diminished supply as a result of growers' attempts to protect themselves.
"I provided the tree-farmer with another option to monetize his
tree. I expect that my activity will incentivize potential tree-farmers to
45
invest in new trees now that they know there is a market for them"
The woman was satisfied with this argument, and wished Robert
good luck. Robert breathed a sigh of relief, having determined ~hat the
property did in fact belong to Tim. He proceeded to the pohce department to engage the SheriffSheriff.
PART II: THE SHERIFF AND THE PRICE OF RISK

A. Compensation for a Risky Investment
Upon his arrival, Robert described the apple tree affair to the
Sheriff, and explained that he wanted to be compensated for the apples Jim had stolen in the past. The Sheriff thought this to be reasonable on the condition that Robert could prove Jim's cakes were made
us~g his apples. Additionally, the Sheriff assured Robert that Jim
would be imprisoned in the event that Jim stole any more appl~s~a
threat that would afford Robert significant leverage when negotiatmg
a price for the apples.
The Sheriff was concerned, however, that Robert may take advantage of his now superior bargaining position;_ the Sheri~was also_ a
patron of Jim's bakery. "How will you determme the pnce you will
demand from Jim?" asked the Sheriff.
"I expect that I will negotiate for the highest price I ca~ attain~"
Robert answered. "I have taken on significant risk in pursmt of this

e.g., Incase, Inc. v. Timex Corp., 488 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2007); Tax Track Systems
Corp. v. New Investor World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2007): A func~ioning
patent system "negates the natural incentive to conceal profi~able mforma~10n by
creating an incentive to disclose through the grant_ of the pate~t i:g?t ... [a~d] m~uce~
an inventor to incur the financial risks involved m commercrnhzmg [an] mvent1on.
Jones, supra note 4, at 1044.
.
.
45 See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 129-30 ("It is important to keep m mmd,
however, that by rewarding inventors who otherwise w?uld h~ve failed to reali~e any
gains from their patents, NPEs could encourag~ further mven~10n by both those mv~n
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social welfare that results from enforcement of dormant patents."). Additionally, a
well-functioning market for patents is essential for early-stage technology compani~s
to raise capital. See Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 43, ~t. 215 ("By enhancing liquidity in technology markets, NPEs create the very conditions that enable venture
capital to support start-up companies.").
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venture, and the potential pay-out must be high to make my expenditures worthwhile."
The Sheriff was still uncomfortable with the situation. "Yes, I
suppose from your perspective it is reasonable to seek the highest
price. But if I prevent Jim from using apples from your tree, he will be
forced to stop baking apple cakes, or expend considerable effort to
find a new source of apples. This will give you leverage to extract a
greater-than-market price for apples that Jim buys from you. Your
opportunistic behavior will increase the cost of apple cakes without
providing any social benefit. " 46
"What I am doing is socially beneficial," explained Robert. "You
mustn't restrict your analysis to a particular segment of the marketplace." Robert recounted the discussion with the woman at the property registry. "If you accept that we need individuals who plant and care
for fruit-bearing trees, it follows that those individuals must have a
way to protect their rights. But enforcement comes only at a cost-a
cost that will be borne, at least in part, by consumers."
"Without tree-growers," added the Sheriff, "we couldn't have apple cakes. So your activity will force the market to internalize all of
the costs that go into producing apple cakes." 47
"That's correct," Robert approved. "And part of that cost is the
risk associated with enforcing property rights."
The Sheriff chimed in, "You need a potentially high return on
your investment for the same reason that a venture capitalist requires
the prospect of a high return: you both need the possibility of a great
reward to incentivize your investment in a risky venture." 48
46
Cf Hosie, supra note 17, at 81 ("Getting an injunction on behalf of a perceived troll on a minor feature incorporated into an important software product is
somewhat like trying to teach a dodo to fly: the bird was flightless and is now extinct.
It just will not happen. Given all the hysteria about injunctive relief and consequent
settlement leverage, how often has a court actually entered an injunction on behalf of
a perceived troll to shut down an ongoing business? I know of no case, though perhaps the now-notorious RlM case came closest (injunction threatened but not in
place). One case out of thousands hardly constitutes a litigation crisis.").
47
See Greenspoon & Cottle, supra note 43 , at 215 ("Even where their success in patent enforcement might lead a licensee to raise prices, the pre-license price
might have been sub-competitive, since it did not incorporate the true costs of inputs
before the license fee was paid."); see also Jones, supra note 4, at 1045 ("By seeking
out free-riders and enforcing the patent right against them, NPEs force a free-rider to
internalize some of the costs associated with copying.").
48
NPEs must seek high returns in order to account for the high cost and
uncertainty inherent in patent litigation. See Johnson et al., supra note 42 , at 490
(comparing the approaches taken by NPEs and venture capitalists, and noting that
"[f]rom the point of view of the troll, one significant 'win' will more than pay for a
large number. of misses").
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With that, Robert left to prepare the evidence he needed to show
that Jim was stealing his apples. He set up a video camera by the tree,
collected footprints and fingerprints, and interviewed some of Jim's
employees at the bakery. He returned to the Sheriff with all of this,
which the Sheriff considered sufficient.
B. Holdup
The following morning, Robert and the Sheriff traveled to the
market, where Jim was selling his goods. The Sheriff disbanded the
long line-up of customers waiting to purchase apple-cakes. Predictably, Jim was irate and demanded an explanation. The Sheriff explained to him that Jim had wrongfully appropriated the apples he
used in his cakes, and that he was enjoined from selling more cakes
until he and Robert could agree on a price to be paid for the apples.
Angry though Jim was, he wanted to continue selling his cakes.
The price of apples was typically just under $1 per pound, so Jim offered to pay Robert a fair price of $1 per pound for his apples. Robert
refused this offer, and demanded $2 per pound. 49
Jim sat down and pondered the situation. At $2 per pound of apples, he would still tum a profit-though he would probably have to
raise the price of his cakes-and it would almost certainly cost him
more to find a new source of quality apples. 50 The apples from Robert's tree were the secret to Jim's cakes. Jim doubted whether it would
even be possible to find comparable apples. 51 But $2 for a pound of
apples was unprecedented; no one would pay so much, even for excellent apples. If not for the Sheriff's decree, Jim would not even consider paying such a high price.
49

See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) ("[T]he threat of an injunction can enable a patent
holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of the patent holder's true economic contribution."). Justice Kennedy expressed this view, concurring with the eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C. decision:
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. For these firms, an
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be
employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy
licenses to practice the patent. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
50
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 49 at 2008 ("[I]t is not the underlying
value of the patented technology, but the cost to the defendant of switching technologies midstream, that is driving the high royalties being paid.").
51
Shrestha, supra note 2, at 123 ("NPEs may be demanding the seemingly
high licensing fees because they own the foundational patents that made the products
possible in the first place.").
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Jim's frustration got the better of him. "This is extortion!" 52 he
yelled at the Sheriff. "Why not just force Robert to accept a reasonable price?" 53
"The tree is my property!" exclaimed Robert. "Sheriff, you would
diminish the value of my property by denying me the basic right to
exclude others from its use?" 54
This was the scenario that the Sheriff had feared. Was this the
right way to handle the dispute? 55 The Sheriff pondered the situation,
attempting see the bigger picture. On one hand, Robert's holdup price
would raise the price of apple cakes-ostensibly a deadweight loss.
Likewise, the ability of tree-farmers to extract holdup prices may be a
disincentive for bakers to produce new baked goods. 56 On the other
hand, the work of tree farmers is valuable. 57 As Robert had argued
52

NPEs have been accused of "engaging in nothing more than legalized
extortion." McDonough, supra note 8, at 196-97 (quoting Bernard Stamler, Battles of
the Patents, Like David v. Goliath, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at G2).
53
Holdup is enabled by the threat of injunctive relief Thomas F. Cotter,
Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1171
(2009) ("Absent the threat of injunctive relief, there would not appear to be a holdup
problem, since the defendant (by hypothesis) could simply use the patent and pay
court-ordered damages.").
54
McDonough, supra note 8, at 197 ("Limiting the patent holder's ability to
stop the infringing activity will severely diminish the value of patents because the
only right inherent in a patent is the right to exclude others from its use.") (citing 35
U.S.C. § 261 (2000)).
55
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), the Supreme
Court was confronted with the question of under what circumstances a court should
issue an injunction on behalf of a patentee. The Court rejected the Federal Circuit's
categorical rule "'that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged."' Id. at 393-94 (citing 401 F.3d 1323, 1338). Before an injunction can be granted, "[a] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4)
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction." 547 U.S.
at 391. Although the four-factor test clearly reduces the availability of injunctive
relief, there is disagreement with respect to how the Ebay decision will affect NPEs.
See Cotter, supra note 53, at 1174 ("[C]ommentators have struggled to define precisely when injunctive relief is appropriate, with some taking the view that injunctive
relief is rarely advisable when the plaintiff is a nonmanufacturing patent owner, and
others reading the eBay decision more narrowly.").
56
Shrestha points out that arguments against NPEs, relating to the effect of
their activity on downstream prices, "simply [echo] arguments against the patent
system as a whole. The U.S. patent system seeks to reward inventors by providing
them with a monopoly over their invention for a limited time. Therefore, patents
typically have all the efficiency-reducing characteristics of monopolies." Shrestha,
supra note 2, at 121-22.
57
The question of whether to allow patentees an injunctive remedy has been
framed as a problem of balancing upstream and downstream incentives. See Cotter,
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previously, tree-farmers must be confident that their rights can be
protected in order to incentivize investment in new trees. 58 Moreover,
the Sheriff remembered, the increased price of apple-cakes does not
only represent a deadweight loss; it represents the cost of enforcement. 59 Those who undertake to enforce the property rights of treefarmers must be compensated for the risk inherent in their business.
Jim interrupted the Sheriffs thoughts. "What if others choose to
take advantage of your injunction policy? Next, I'll be enjoined from
selling my cakes because someone claims a property right in the eggs
or the flour that I am using. 60 These individuals will all seek a profitmaximizing price for my use of their goods, which will be above market price because of their enhanced bargaining power. Eventually, the
cost of ingredients will exceed the value of a cake, and I will be
forced to stop baking." 61
"Such an outcome is unlikely," retorted Robert. "Rational actors
who wish to realize a profit have no incentive to halt the production of
goods that might otherwise be a source of revenue. Should the parties
reach an impasse, property owners would be strongly encouraged to
lower their prices individually, or collaborate to collectively charge a
practicable price. A party stands to profit from purchasing all of the
assets, only if it charges a price at which production can continue."
The Sheriff decided not to lift the injunction, and the parties
agreed to the price of $2/pound of apples.
Robert returned home to fill in the balance sheet for the venture.
Not surprisingly, Robert found that he did not do all that well. Desupra note 53 , at 1168 ("If there is reason to believe that allowing patentees to extract holdup-induced rents generates more social harm, in terms of both static
deadweight losses and disincentives on the part of downstream users to invest in the
application of new technologies, than social benefits in the form of incentives directed
towards upstream innovators, then courts may be well-advised to take steps to mitigate holdup .... ").
58
See Paul R. Michel, Fellow Citizens: Be On Guard, J. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE Soc'Y, April 2010, http://www.jptos.org/chief-judge-paulmichel-speech.html ("Patents, and the protection of investment they afford, provide
the only incentives strong enough to cause increased private investment in researchbased companies.").
59
Those who argue that high rents (that is, greater than would be available
absent the threat of injunctive relief) on the part of an NPE constitutes deadweight
loss, fail to take account of the utility and cost of enforcing patents. If one accepts that
NPE activity has value, this "deadweight loss" is really compensation for the NPEs
contribution.
60
The circumstance in which a product is covered by multiple patents is
termed "royalty stacking." See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 1993.
61
Lemley and Shapiro contend that the combination of royalty stacking and
holdup "can even lead to circumstances in which no one can profitably produce a
product with social value." Id. at 2010.
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pending on how long Jim's extant sales continued, Robert determined
that he would likely lose money. 62 However, Robert was not easily
discouraged. He did successfully enforce his property rights in the
tree, and was convinced that there was money to be made.
PART ill: THE MAKINGS OF A SPECIALIST

Having succeeded with his first venture, Robert decided to seek
out similar opportunities. But, he was not sure how to go about his
search. Somehow he would have to discern which fruit trees were
subject to theft, or at least were likely to be pilfered. But he would
also need to fmd tree-owners who were in need of his servicespresumably those who lacked the means and resources to enforce their
rights themselves. This was all very daunting to Robert, so he consulted with Christina, a past business partner, for advice.
When Robert arrived at Christina's house, she was in the process
of cooking dinner. Robert sat in the living room while she fmished
with the last preparations. He noticed Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" on the coffee table, and began flipping through it as he waited.
Christina entered the room. "I've been brushing up on some economic theory ~uring my spare time," she explained.
Robert described his enforcement venture, and explained the challenge he faced if he were to pursue the business further. The two first
discussed the problem of identifying valuable trees from which people
may be likely to steal. Although they identified a number of metrics to
predict tree value, they determined that to make such a prediction accurately would necessitate significant expertise. Robert would have to
learn not only to recognize the indicia of a valuable tree, but also to
survey the market place and keep track of products incorporating
fruits that might have been stolen from trees that he is enforcing. Additionally, Robert learned from his previous venture that enforcing
property rights is very expensive. Only a highly valuable tree, whose

62
Contrary to what some believe, for example, NPE business models are
difficult to operate profitably. Some have performed very well, although this is hardly
a reliable outcome. See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 8, at 196 (commentator accused
NPEs of "manipulat[ing] the patent system for large profits") (quoting Roy Mark,
Tech Wants Patent 'Trolls' Tamed, INTERNETNEWSCOM , Apr. 26, 2005,
http://www.intemetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3500546); See also Hosie, supra
note 17, at 83-84 ("After paying the lawyers and the inventors (often on a royalty
revenue share basis), there just is not much left for this troll. Over the five year period
2002-06, Acacia Technologies Group lost close to $35 million. This is hardly a 'very,
very profitable business model."' (internal citations omitted)).
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fruits are being used to make a commercially successful product, will
warrant enforcement. 63
"Once you have garnered this expertise," Christina postulated,
"you needn't concern yourself with the abilities of the tree-owners."
"But I do. Why would someone need my services if she had the
means to enforce her property rights herself?" asked Robert.
Christina pointed to the book on the table. "Because specialization
promotes efficiency," she said, as she retired to the kitchen and returned with two plates of chicken casserole. "Consider this casserole. I
might have raised the chicken myself, grown the vegetables, and
milled wheat into flour, but I know nothing of those activities. I would
have had to spend significant time learning the necessary skills and
making mistakes. Instead, I run a business; that is what I am good at. I
take the money I make from my work and purchase the ingredients I
need from specialists who produce them. By specializing and developing expertise, we save time and produce more efficiently.
"Adam Smith recognized this when he discussed the division of
labor. He reasoned that one who is focused on a particular line of
work is better able to discover more efficient methods of performing
that work. By contrast, one who spreads her attention across multiple
endeavors cannot spend enough time analyzing any one of them to
c.
.
.
64
per.iect its practice.
"Someone who plants and grows fruit trees commands expertise
in tree farming; her time is best spent using that expertise by caring
for trees. Any time she spends pursuing activities outside of her expertise-enforcing property rights, for example-will not be nearly as
65
.
productive,
and w1·11 waste resources. "
63

See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 128 ("NPEs can therefore perform an important function by sifting through the patents owned by independent inventors and
identifying the most valuable ones. By repeatedly analyzing and buying patents,
NPEs become experts at differentiating between valuable and trivial patents and rewarding the inventors accordingly.").
64
See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 13 (1806) ("Men are much more likely to discover easier and
readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is
directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety of
things. But in consequence of the division oflabour, the whole of every man's attention comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simple object.").
65
See Marc Morgan, Comment, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll,
17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 173-74 (2008) ("Inventors maximize efficiency by focusing on
inventing and allowing other parties to deal with enforcement or licensing of patents.
Indeed, many inventors find enforcement or licensing of patents to be distracting,
time consuming, and costly."); see also Shrestha, supra note 2, at 128 ("By selling the
rights to their invention, the inventors could focus their attention and resources on the
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"you needn't concern yourself with the abilities of the tree-owners."
"But I do. Why would someone need my services if she had the
means to enforce her property rights herself?" asked Robert.
Christina pointed to the book on the table. "Because specialization
promotes efficiency," she said, as she retired to the kitchen and returned with two plates of chicken casserole. "Consider this casserole. I
might have raised the chicken myself, grown the vegetables, and
milled wheat into flour, but I know nothing of those activities. I would
have had to spend significant time learning the necessary skills and
making mistakes. Instead, I run a business; that is what I am good at. I
take the money I make from my work and purchase the ingredients I
need from specialists who produce them. By specializing and developing expertise, we save time and produce more efficiently.
"Adam Smith recognized this when he discussed the division of
labor. He reasoned that one who is focused on a particular line of
work is better able to discover more efficient methods of performing
that work. By contrast, one who spreads her attention across multiple
endeavors cannot spend enough time analyzing any one of them to
c.
.
.
64
per.iect its practice.
"Someone who plants and grows fruit trees commands expertise
in tree farming; her time is best spent using that expertise by caring
for trees. Any time she spends pursuing activities outside of her expertise-enforcing property rights, for example-will not be nearly as
65
.
product1ve,
and w1·11 waste resources. "
63

See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 128 (''NPEs can therefore perform an important function by sifting through the patents owned by independent inventors and
identifying the most valuable ones. By repeatedly analyzing and buying patents,
NPEs become experts at differentiating between valuable and trivial patents and rewarding the inventors accordingly.").
64
See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 13 (1806) ("Men are much more likely to discover easier and
readier methods of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is
directed towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety of
things. But in consequence of the division oflabour, the whole of every man's attention comes naturally to be directed towards some one very simple object.").
65
See Marc Morgan, Comment, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll,
17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 173-74 (2008) ("Inventors maximize efficiency by focusing on
inventing and allowing other parties to deal with enforcement or licensing of patents.
Indeed, many inventors find enforcement or licensing of patents to be distracting,
time consuming, and costly."); see also Shrestha, supra note 2, at 128 ("By selling the
rights to their invention, the inventors could focus their attention and resources on the
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"That's it!" exclaimed Robert, "My expertise will allow me to enforce property rights more efficiently and at a lesser expense than a
tree farmer, who could contract me to enforce her rights at a lower
cost than she could do it herself." 66
"F~hermore," ~dded Christina, "tree farmers have not developed
e:x-pert1se at e_valuatmg trees for the purposes of enforcing property
nghts, or puttmg together deals with potential buyers. You will make
the tree-farming industry more efficient by relieving them of these
67
tasks. Large entities, like apple orchards, c~uld also benefit from
Y_Our services .. Even though they can afford to enforce their property
nghts, they will benefit from your expertise. " 68
PART IV: FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS AND QUESTIONABLE
RIGHTS

Years passed, and Robert's success earned him some notoriety.
Tree farmers without the means to enforce their property rights knew
that Robert would purchase their trees from them in the event their
property rights were being infringed. Orchards and other large growing operations outsourced the enforcement of their property rights to
Robert, which liberated resources that were now being put to more
productive uses.
Robert's reputation, however, was hardly untarnished. Bakers,
grocers, restaurant owners, and other businesses for which fruit is a
raw material were becoming increasingly frustrated. They had not
previously had to concern themselves with the propriety of their
.'
69
fru1t
s source. As well, many began accusing Robert of enforcing
questionable property rights. It was said that his targets would give in
~o his demands in order to avoid the expense of denying them~ven
1f they thought Robert's claims against them were weak.
pursuit of inventive activity instead of spending time and energy on trying to commercialize their invention." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66
Jones, supra note 4, at 1036 ("[The] transaction between inventor and NPE
can be viewed as a division of cooperative labor, allowing each entity to do what it
does best whether that is inve~ting or enforcing patent rights.").
67
Allen W. Wang, Rzse of the Patent Intermediaries, 25 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 159, 164 (2010) ("[I]t is a rare company... that has any clue whatsoever about
how to value, analyze, and structure ... iP asset transfers." (internal quotations omitted)).
68
.~ Navigation Group is an example of an NPE that specializes in enforcing
and monetizmg the patents for other companies, often companies whose enforcement
efforts have been "disappointing and ... expensive experiences .... " We Monetize
Patents, IP NAVIGATION GROUP, http://ipnav.com/Our-Solutions/solutions (last visited
Feb. 26, 2012).
69
See supra note 40 .
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Robert was at one of his client's apple orchards, evaluating the
trees, when an employee approached him. "You're the property enforcer that we hired, aren't you?" asked the employee. "I hear you
make your money by exploiting the system to enforce property rights
of questionable validity. People enter into early settlements with you
because it costs them less than defending against your claims."
Robert had heard these accusations before, and it bothered himthis was not a strategy he employed.. "That is not how I operate," replied Robert. "I spend considerable time analyzing trees to determine
which ones are worth enforcing. I consider not only the value of the
tree and whether its fruit is being put to use, but also whether its owner has a valid property right."
"Why does it matter that the property right is valid if your targets
will settle with you regardless?" questioned the employee.
70
"They won't simply settle with me regardless of validity. It may
cost less to settle than to defend against a given claim, but a policy of
settling only reinforces the strategy of enforcing questionable rights.
Having a reputation for settling weak claims will be more costly in the
long run. A business with such a reputation will establish itself as an
71
easy target, drawing a potential flood of enforcement actions."
"That shouldn't prevent you from making the claim," said the
employee. "The more enforcement actions you initiate, the more opportunities you have for settlements or wins."
72
Robert replied, "Enforcing property rights is very expensive. I
only initiate an enforcement action if I am confident that the right I

70 See Wang, supra note 67, at 178-79 ("[C]ompanies have started to c~n
sider their patent portfolios with more care and devote more resources to defendmg
their right to conduct business activities."); see also Shrestha, supra note 2, at 120
(quoting Jay Monaham, the deputy general counsel of eBay, sayin~ that eBay's _approach to NPE suits "has been t~, vigorously defend ourselves agamst these claims
and not to pay ransom money.... ).
71 See ,Hosie, supra note 17 , at 79-80 ("Smart companies, particularly those
frequently sued, do not settle frivolous cases. While doing so might save mon~y
against defense costs in one case, the cost of being seen as a soft sett:lement to~ch will
be brutally expensive across the entire litigation portfolio, reachmg ever mto the
future.").
. .
72 A 2011 survey by the American Intellectual Property Association found
that the median cost of a patent infringement suit with less than $1 million at risk was
$650,000; with $25 million at risk, the median cost was $5 million. American Intellectual Property Association, Report of the Economic Survey 2011 (July 2011); see
also ,Hosie, supra note 17, at 80 ("The cost of building and trying a patent case can
easily exceed $4 million.").
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am enforcing is valid. 73 Of course there will always be uncertainty,
but I simply cannot afford to initiate frivolous claims."
The employee went on his way, having been convinced by Robert's explanation. Robert finished evaluating the trees in the orchard
with no further confrontations. The employee, however, was not the
only person that had approached Robert to offer a criticism of his
work. It occurred to Robert that he might be better off enforcing intellectual property rights instead.
CONCLUSION

NPEs play an important role in an idea economy, the structure of
which promotes inequalities among participants. By creating a market
for patents and posing a credible threat of litigation, NPEs enable
small entities, startups, and individual inventors to participate in and
benefit from the patent regime. Additionally, NPEs command valuable and scarce expertise in patent licensing and enforcement. By specializing in these activities, NPEs permit inventors and manufacturers
to more efficiently allocate resources, and focus on their respective
specialties. This Comment argues, moreover, that higher rent extracted by NPEs is necessary to compensate them for the uncertainty and
cost of enforcing patents. Thus, the cost that NPEs impose on productive industries and, concomitantly on consumers, does not represent a
deadweight loss. On the contrary, it is the cost of operating a patent
system that tailors to the needs of small entities, startups, individual
inventors, and venture capitalists-integral participants in the economy. This Comment also refutes the assertion that NPEs routinely en73
See Shrestha, supra note 2, at 120 ("Given the enormous cost of litigating
infringement suits, it is doubtful whether a rational NPE, or a contingency fee attorney, would sue a defendant if there was a low probability of a positive outcome.");
Jones, supra note 4, at 1046--47 (''NPEs face tough choices in enforcing patents, and
will not likely do so if they hold a weak patent that is most likely invalid."); ,Hosie,
supra note 17, at 80 (''No sane plaintiffs lawyer would spend this kind of money on
a frivolous case."). Indeed, empirical data does not support the contention that NPEs
initiate frivolous lawsuits. In a study analyzing the activity of 51 NPEs, Shrestha
found that NPE initiated infringement suits were slightly more likely to be successful
than those initiated by other plaintiffs. Shrestha, supra note 2, at 148. Moreov~r, an
empirical study of the 50 most litigated patents, by Lemley et al., determined that "the
characteristics that distinguish the most-litigated patents from other patents are also
the ones that researchers have long used to identify the most-valuable patents .... A
reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that the most-litigated patents are also the mostvaluable patents." Allison, supra note 10, at 28. They also found that the vast majority
of these patents were held by NPEs. Id.
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force weak patents and file frivolous claims, by exposing this strategy
as irrational and ineffective. These arguments must be seriously considered before any further legal or judicial changes are made in an
effort to thwart NPEs, especially if these decisions would weaken the
protection afforded to patent owners. A misstep could have serious
economic consequences.
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